Gulf Wars

Contents:

One of the far-flung places in which the U.S. government acquired a stake after World War II and reinforced during the Cold War was the Middle East. The attraction was oil and domestic politics, specifically regarding support for the new state of Israel and control of the region. Contrary to common misconception, Soviet expansion was a minor concern compared to awakening Arab nationalism, which was by nature hostile to both Soviet communism and American hegemony.

The supposedly vital U.S. interest in the Middle East easily rationalized the sacrifice of taxpayers’ treasure on behalf American “allies.” It also created enemies who would not always distinguish between the U.S. government and the American people.

The combination of oil and Israel motivated advocates of an expansionist U.S. foreign policy to favor bold measures to gain influence and power in the Middle East. The United States thus had to have a hand in every intra-regional conflict, picking clients and undermining any rivals. A key example is Iran, where the United States backed a brutal, but pro-U.S. monarch, the Shah--helping him return to power in 1953 after a popular middle-class movement drove him from power. Predictably, when the Shah was overthrown in 1979 by Islamic radicals, the U.S. government was targeted for retribution. The American embassy was seized and dozens of hostages were held for a lengthy period. With the Iranian regime now seen as the chief threat to U.S. interests in the region, the policymakers predictably favored Iraq when it went to war against Iran in 1980. The new leader of secular Iraq, and the latest American client, was Saddam Hussein, who received vital U.S. intelligence and other valuable assistance during the conflict.

When the devastating ten-year war ended in a stalemate, the newly prestigious Hussein aspired to lead the Arab world. High on his agenda were long-time grievances with Kuwait. When the U.S. ambassador told Hussein that his dispute with the Kuwaiti monarchy was a purely Arab affair, he invaded the emirate. Exaggerating the threat to the West, American policymakers, with U.N. cover, assembled a coalition of nations to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and demand that Hussein, now the bête noir of the U.S., destroy “weapons of mass destruction.” To that end, the United States stationed troops in Saudi Arabia, including near holy Islamic sites; bombed the Iraqi civilian infrastructure to rubble; and imposed an economic embargo on Iraq killing over 500,000 children and lasting more than ten years after the Gulf War ended.

The result of the war was an on-going U.S. garrison in Saudi Arabia, ten years of low-level but civilian-killing warfare against Iraq, and increased military aid to Israel, despite unrelenting occupation of Palestinian territory, and almost every other regime in the entire region.

Although justified as “democratizing” Iraq and eliminating a despotic dictator who could give terrorists weapons of mass destruction (an unlikely senario according to the CIA), the invasion of Iraq in Gulf War II was more likely about improving Israel’s security, obtaining a central U.S. military outpost in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, and settling old scores wih Saddam Hussein from Gulf War I and the ensuing decade of containment. After invading Iraq, the United States is faced with the unpleasant choice of a long military occupation and expensive reconstruction of the country or letting it disintegrate into chaos.

Consequences of Gulf War I:

Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. New York: Mariner Books, 1994

Carpenter, Ted Galen, ed. America Entangled: The Persian Gulf Crisis and Its Consequences. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1991.

General:

Gulf War I: Continuation of the Cold War:

—. “Facing the Consequences of the U.S. War in Iraq,” Oakland, Calif.: The Independent Institute, May 2, 2003.

—. “Not Exactly an Eye for an Eye,” San Francisco Chronicle, June 23, 2003.

—. “Some Are Weeping, Some Are Not,” Oakland, Calif.: The Independent Institute, April 26, 2003.

Military Analysis of Gulf War I:

Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993.

Summers, Harry. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.

Watson, Bruce W., Bruce George, Peter Tsouras, and B.L. Cyr. Military Lessons of the Gulf War. Greenhill Press, 1993.

Truth in Gulf War I:

Clark, Ramsey. Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994.